Optimal timing of use reduction vs. harm reduction in a drug epidemic model

References 

1. Bachman JG, Johnston LD, O’Malley PM. Explaining the recent increases in students’ marijuana use: The impacts of perceived risks and disapproval from 1976 through 1996. American Journal of Public Health. 1998;88:887–892
   • MEDLINE
   • CrossRef
2. Bass FM. A new product growth model for consumer durables. Management Science. 1969;15:215–227
3. Baveja A, Batta R, Caulkins JP, Karwan MH. Modeling the response of illicit drug markets to local enforcement. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences. 1993;27:73–89
   • CrossRef
4. Behrens DA, Caulkins JP, Tragler G, Haunschmied JL, Feichtinger GA. Optimal control of drug epidemics: Prevent and treat—But not at the same time. Management Science. 2000;46:333–347
5. Bretteville-Jensen A-L. Drug demand—Initiation continuation and quitting. De Economist. 2006;154(4):491–516
6. Caulkins JP. Local drug markets’ response to focused police enforcement. Operations Research. 1993;41:848–863
   • CrossRef
7. Caulkins J. Models pertaining to how drug policy should vary over the course of an epidemic cycle. In:  Lindgren B,  Grossman M editor. Substance use: Individual behavior, social interactions, markets, and politics, advances in health economics and health services research. Vol. 16:Amsterdam: Elsevier; 2005;p. 407–439
8. Caulkins, J. P., Feichtinger, G., Tragler, G., & Wallner, D. (in press). When in a drug epidemic should the policy objective switch from use reduction to harm reduction? European Journal of Operations Research.
9. Caulkins JP, Pacula R, Paddock S, Chiesa J. School-based drug prevention: What kind of drug use does it prevent?. Santa Monica, CA: RAND; 2002;
10. Cook C, Kanaef N. The global state of harm reduction: Mapping the response to drug-related HIV and hepatitis C epidemics. London: International Harm Reduction Association; 2008;
11. Coomber R. Pusher myths: Re-situating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books; 2006;
12. Dave D. The effects of cocaine and heroin price on drug-related emergency department visits. Journal of Health Economics. 2006;25:311–333
    • MEDLINE
    • CrossRef
13. Dave D. Illicit drug use among arrestees, prices and policy. Journal of Urban Economics. 2008;63:694–714
14. Desimone J, Farrelly MC. Price and enforcement effects on cocaine and marijuana demand. Economic Inquiry. 2003;41(1):98–115
    • CrossRef
15. Everingham SS, Rydell CP. Modeling the demand for cocaine. Santa Monica, CA: RAND; 1994;
16. Farrelly, M. C., Bray, J. W., Zarkin, G. A., Wendling, B. W., & Pacula, R. L. (1999). The effects of prices and policies on the demand for marijuana: Evidence from the national household surveys on drug abuse. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper number 6940.
17. Ferrence R. Diffusion theory and drug use. Addiction. 2001;96:165–173
    • MEDLINE
    • CrossRef
18. Gladwell M. The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference. Boston: Little Brown; 2000;
19. Golub A, Johnson BD. The crack epidemic: Empirical findings support a hypothesized diffusion of innovation process. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences. 1996;30(3):221–231
    • CrossRef
20. Grossman M. Individual behaviors and substance use: The role of price. In:  Lindgren B,  Grossman M editor. Substance use: Individual behavior, social interactions, markets, and politics, advances in health economics and health services research. Vol. 16:Amsterdam: Elsevier; 2005;p. 407–439
21. Kirby KN, Petry NM. Heroin and cocaine abusers have higher discount rates for delayed rewards than alcoholics or non-drug-using controls. Addiction. 2004;99:461–471
    • MEDLINE
    • CrossRef
22. Kleiman MAR. Crackdowns: The effects of intensive enforcement on retail heroin dealing. In:  Chaiken MR editors. Street-level drug enforcement: Examining the issues. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; 1988;
23. Kleiman MAR. Enforcement swamping: A positive-feedback mechanism in rates of illicit activity. Mathematical and Computer Modeling. 1993;17:65–75
24. MacCoun RJ. Toward a psychology of harm reduction. American Psychologist. 1998;53:1199–1208
25. Moore MH. Buy and bust: The effective regulation of an illicit market in heroin. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books; 1977;
26. Moore TJ. What is Australia's “Drug Budget”? The policy mix of illicit drug-related government spending in Australia. Fitzroy: Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Centre; 2005;
27. Musto D. The American disease. 2nd ed.. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1987;
28. Rigter H. What drug policies cost: Drug policy spending in the Netherlands in 2003. Addiction. 2006;101:323–329
    • MEDLINE
    • CrossRef
29. Single E, Collins D, Easton B, Harwood H, Lapsley H, Kopp P, et al. International guidelines for estimating the costs of substance abuse. 2nd ed.. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2003;
30. Tragler G, Caulkins JP, Feichtinger G. Optimal dynamic allocation of treatment and enforcement in illicit drug control. Operations Research. 2001;49:352–362
    • CrossRef
31. Wallner, D. (2008). Dynamic models of drug users and susceptibles: Optimal mix of use reduction and harm reduction in Australia and the U.S.A. Doctoral Thesis. Institute for Mathematical Methods in Economics, Vienna University of Technology.
32. Wilde, G. J. S. (1994). Target risk. PDE Publications. Available online at http://www.psyc.queensu.ca/target/index.html.
33. Winkler D, Caulkins JP, Behrens D, Tragler G. Estimating the relative efficiency of various forms of prevention at different stages of a drug epidemic. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences. 2004;38:43–56
    • CrossRef