Commentary
Kyrgyzstan – A virtual narco-state?

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.01.012Get rights and content

Abstract

Numerous myths have surrounded the drug trade in Central Asia over the past two decades. Analysts writing on the issue and the law enforcement structures of the respective countries often have no complete and accurate information about the scale of the trade, the different groups involved and the role of drugs-related money in politics. Generally there are two dominating views: the first considers Kyrgyzstan to be a virtual narco-state and overstates the involvement of politicians and police officials; the alternative underestimates the role of state representatives, describes the smuggling as more decentralised and chaotic and emphasises the role of organised crime gangs and radical Islamic organisations. Based on the interviews in the field conducted in January–March 2012, this paper analyses these alternative perspectives and the empirical evidence supporting these views. It highlights methodological problems relating to research on similar issues, elucidates networks of smuggling and their links with politics and reflects on complexities in addressing these challenges.

Introduction

Drug trafficking has corrupted the law enforcement apparatus as well as politics in Kyrgyzstan and has thus became a national security threat. Observers have used various labels including the ‘narco-state’ to describe the crucial role Kyrgyzstan plays in the transit of Afghan opiates to Russian and European markets. However there is currently a lack of comprehensive and accurate analysis of the involvement of the state on a formal level and of the networks engaged in drug smuggling. Many reports are based on the rumours and hearsay and do not stand up to the standards of well-grounded empirical research. However this is not solely due to the secrecy of the data or the reluctance of law enforcement to share sensitive information. Numerous conversations with various government agencies in Kyrgyzstan, in my capacity as a consultant to the government on fighting organised crime, suggest that no institution has complete and accurate information about the quantities, groups and routes of trafficking. Officers from the same police departments often give conflicting accounts of the same problem. Moreover they tend to oversimplify and externalise the threat blaming outside actors in organising drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. Despite an evident vested interest in appearing clean and professional and in transferring the blame, the problem of law enforcement's own corruption is so acute that many officers speak about its pervasiveness and the way in which it facilitates and promotes the drug trade. Representatives of NGOs, the expert community and drug users have different perspectives. Their narrative of the problem implies that the police are a key actor in the smuggling and perhaps exaggerate the complicity of politicians and law enforcement officials. As this paper demonstrates there is empirical evidence supporting both claims although it is not entirely clear which groups dominate the market. Smuggling networks often comprise both organized crime groups as well as the representatives of law enforcement institutions albeit in different roles and with various forms of involvement. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of drug smuggling networks and to categorise these forms of involvement. The key question posed is whether the country is a ‘narco-state’ meaning whether the highest ranking officials run drug trafficking operations and state structures are misused for extracting illicit profit from the drug trade (Paoli, Rabkov, Greenfield, & Reuter, 2007). It will be argued that Kyrgyzstan came closest to being defined in this way under the leadership of President Kurmanbek Bakiev, although high ranking involvement in illicit trade is still a significant problem.

Part of the research was done within the framework of consulting the government of Kyrgyzstan. In January–March 2012 I was based at the National Institute of Strategic Studies under the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, which was the institution that facilitated most of my contacts with high ranking law enforcement officials. Overall more than 70 interviews have been conducted in Bishkek and Osh in January–March 2012 and analytical data has been obtained from various government institutions including the Ministry of the Interior, Supreme Court and the Drug Control Agency. The data from more than 20 interviews is used in this article.

I had initially arranged meetings with the ministers and/or deputy ministers of all law enforcement structures in charge of fighting drugs trade (State Security Committee, Ministry of Interior, and State Drug Control Agency), introduced my research project to them, and agreed on how exactly I would collaborate with all parties involved. I then selected the departments of these law enforcement structures that deal with issues of organized crime and drugs trafficking and set up interviews with their representatives. The officers in medium and lower ranks eagerly cooperated ‘having the permission from above’. The semi-structured interviews with acting and retired law enforcement officers focused on several thematic issues such as the nature of the drugs trafficking organisations (DTOs), their methods and tactics of criminal activity, the link between drugs trade and politics. The drug users were mainly asked about the ways to obtain drugs and practices of the police to address the problem. Some of these respondents agreed to an interview on the basis of anonymity hence their identities are sometimes not disclosed. None of the interviews were transcribed. The respondents are hesitant to speak on confidential issues if they are recorded. The researcher mostly took notes during the interviews. Apart from primary sources, data from secondary sources was also scrutinised including newspapers, reports from government institutions and international organisations.

The paper is structured in the following way: firstly there is a comprehensive review of the development of the drug trade over the past two decades from chaotic trade to organised trafficking featuring the involvement of sophisticated criminal groups and high ranking bureaucrats; next, the discussion shifts to the presentation of several conflicting perspectives on the nature of the smuggling groups and proposes the categorisation of the actors as owners, transporters, protectors and sellers – the increasing sophistication of smuggling groups and the link with politics means that smuggling extends beyond being a law enforcement problem; finally, the concluding section summarises the arguments presented and analyses possible solutions.

Section snippets

Organised crime, politics and drugs in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan lacks natural resources and a developed industrial base, which has given rise to the lucrative drug trade as an important source of income for organised crime groups and corrupt politicians. This also explains why the drug trade has had less political impact in resource-rich Kazakhstan compared to its poor neighbours Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has become a conduit for illicit drugs due to its geopolitical location, insecure borders, and extensive corruption. Up to twenty

Conflicting perspectives

Generally there are two dominating perspectives on the nature of smuggling networks: the first viewpoint sees Kyrgyzstan as a virtual narco-state and overstates the involvement of politicians and police officials; alternative analysis underestimates the role of state representatives, describes the smuggling as more decentralised and chaotic and emphasises the role of organised crime gangs and radical Islamic organisations. The following two sections examine the empirical evidence supporting

Smuggling groups

The criminological approach to understanding the illegal actors can be grouped into two broad categories: first, behavioural that makes a distinction between ‘protectors’ (krysha) and ‘protected’ in criminal networks and makes a distinction between those who protect/govern/extort and those who ‘produce’ goods or smuggle things (Varese, 2001) and second relational, where organised crime is ‘a web of affiliations’ of individuals in the underworld and upperworld (Liddick, 1999). It needs to be

Sophistication

Arguably drug trafficking groups are increasingly professional and sophisticated. Due to domestic political instability, drug smugglers had to find alternative means for investing money abroad that helped them in forging links with legal institutions such as banks, notaries, audit and law offices. These links have then been operationalised for other purposes. For instance according to the police officers in Osh, one of the southern criminal leaders involved in the drug trade runs a micro-credit

Conclusion

Over the past two decades the drug trade has grown and drug traffickers have penetrated politics. Due to the overall lack of legitimate resources, the drug trade emerged as one of the key income-generating activity in the country. In a quest for lucrative rents, law enforcement officials have gradually become embroiled in this illegal business and overtime have carved out their own market share. The criminalisation of the state was at its height under Bakiev; however it remains a significant

Acknowledgements

The research in January–February 2011 was funded by TraCCC, George Mason University. The research in January–March 2012 was part of my role as a consultant to the Kyrgyz government on issues of organised crime. I was based at National Institute of Strategic Studies under the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan. The author is grateful to Dr. Chingiz Shamshiev for his help in organising access to relevant government structures. The author also acknowledges the help of Dr. Kathryn Cassidy in editing the

References (52)

  • 24.kg. (2007). 6 February. Retrieved 10 May 2013 through Factiva...
  • 24.kg. (2011). 25 April. Retrieved 10 May 2013 through Factiva...
  • AKIpress. (2005). 7 June. Retrieved 10 May 2013 through Factiva...
  • AKIpress. (2012). 3 February. Retrieved 10 May 2013 through Factiva...
  • C.J. Arnson et al.

    Organized crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas

    (2011)
  • J. Bailey et al.

    Evade, corrupt, or confront? Organized crime and the state in Brazil and Mexico

    Journal of Politics in Latin America

    (2009)
  • BBC Worldwide Monitoring

    Kyrgyz ex-drug official says ousted leader's brother behind abolishing agency, 3 July

    (2010)
  • J.S. Beittel

    Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and scope of the violence

    Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress

    (2013)
  • Bordyuzha, N. (2011). Interview with RIA Novosti, 21 February, 2011 retrieved on 9 December 2013 from...
  • Centralasiaonline.com. (2010). 6 August, retrieved 10 June 2011 from...
  • Central Asia Online. (2013). 12 February, retrieved February 2013 from...
  • Centralasia.ru. (2011). 12 February, retrieved 1 March 2012 from...
  • J.M. Cruz

    Central American maras: From youth street gangs to transnational protection rackets

    Global Crime

    (2010)
  • Delo No.

    Newspaper

    (2010)
  • Delo No. (2011), 24 March, interview with Gulmira Shakirova, head of Financial Intelligence Office, retrieved March...
  • Z. Ergueshev

    Criminal groups, terrorist organizations and drug trade and trafficking in Kyrgyzstan

  • Eurasianet. (2007). 3 October, retrieved 5 March 2011 from...
  • Eurasianet. (2013). 4 June 2013, retrieved 9 December 2013 from...
  • Fergananews.com. (2011). 30 August, retrieved 10 January 2011 from...
  • M. Galeotti

    Northern exposure – Afghan heroin trafficking through Central Asia

    Jane's Intelligence Review

    (2012)
  • C. Graubner

    Kyrgyzstan: Mapping the shadow state: the informal political economy of Kyrgyzstan before the Tulip Revolution

    (2005)
  • Hashimova, U. (2009). New supply routes to Afghanistan could boost drugs trafficking, 27 May, retrieved from...
  • ICG. International Crisis Group

    The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Report N°193, 23 August

    (2010)
  • Institute for Public Policy

    Transcript for roundtable ‘drugs as a threat to peace and stability in Central Asia’

    (2013)
  • Kabar. (2010). Informational agency 20 June. Retrieved 10 May 2013 through Factiva...
  • Knews.kg. (2013). Interview with Shamil Atakhanov, retrieved from 1 May 2013 from...
  • Cited by (12)

    • “Not just eliminating the mosquito but draining the swamp”: A critical geopolitics of Turkish Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Turkey's approach to illicit drugs

      2016, International Journal of Drug Policy
      Citation Excerpt :

      In addition to drugs abused customarily by minors and young adults (e.g. alcohol, marijuana, heroin), studies indicate increasing abuse among youth of newer varieties over the past decades (e.g. inhalants, synthetic cannabinoids like Spice or Bonzai, and types of methamphetamine, like Captagon or fenethylline) and associated health risks (e.g. Artuç, Doğan, & Demirci, 2014; Çam, 2010; Evren et al., 2013; Külahcı et al., 2011). State concerns also increased due to illicit drug imports not solely for transit to other countries but for internal consumption; this trade has been particularly stated since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, civil unrest in Syria, ISIL's rise, and reports of increased trafficking to/through Turkey from Iran and various countries of Africa, sometimes with appreciable increases in previously less common drugs, like cocaine (e.g. Arslan et al., 2015; Ekici, 2013; Ekici & Çoban, 2014; Ekici & Özbay, 2013; Ekici & Ünlü, 2013; Kupatadze, 2014; Robins, 2007). Furthermore, authorities document rising rates and expanded areas of production.

    • The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union: How successful is the Russian regional hegemony?

      2016, Journal of Eurasian Studies
      Citation Excerpt :

      The reverse side of the coin could be: the flooding of EAEU markets with cheap Chinese goods, an increased role for Chinese businesses in regional decision-making and the ‘Chinesation’ of Russian and Kazakh regions bordering with China. Illegal trade with China (The Times of Central Asia, 2005), as well as narco-traffic via the permeable Kyrgyz borders (Kupatadze, 2014), make border control strengthening one of the key priorities of the EAEU security policy. The problem of controlling the Southern borders is linked to another geopolitical challenge, the formation of the Islamic Caliphate (IS) in June 2014.

    View all citing articles on Scopus
    View full text