Research paperLegal high industry business and lobbying strategies under a legal market for new psychoactive substances (NPS, ‘legal highs’) in New Zealand
Introduction
Until recently, legal markets for recreational psychoactive products were limited to alcohol and tobacco products. Recent drug law reforms in a number of countries have created new sectors for recreational psychoactive products, including a regulated market for cannabis in a number of US states (Roffman, 2016, Room, 2014) and in Uruguay (Walsh & Ramsey, 2015) and a regulated market for new psychoactive substances (NPS) (‘legal highs’) in New Zealand (Wilkins et al., 2013).
There is an extensive literature examining the tensions between the commercial interests of the alcohol and tobacco industries and public health goals (Adams, 2013, Adams et al., 2010, Babor et al., 2010, Casswell, 2013, Moodie et al., 2013, West and Marteau, 2013). A number of academics have attempted to translate the lessons learnt from regulating the alcohol and tobacco sectors to the new recreational psychoactive industries, particularly in the case of legal recreational cannabis (Caulkins, 2016, Caulkins et al., 2016, Pacula et al., 2014, Room, 2014). This emerging literature has focused on how to regulate the new commercial drug markets from the legislative and regulatory perspective, including how to design regulations to mitigate public health harms (Ghosh et al., 2015). Little research has been completed on how the new ‘addictive consumption industries’ view and respond to this changing market and regulatory environment.
New Zealand has been at the forefront of the legal high phenomena with a large scale legal high industry (LHI) operating since the early 2000s (Sheridan and Butler, 2007, Wilkins and Sweetsur, 2010). However, it was only in 2013, following the passage of the Psychoactive Substances Act (PSA) 2013, that the industry received full official legal recognition and became subject to licensing, auditing and reporting requirements (New Zealand Parliament, 2013a). This paper explores how the LHI actors in New Zealand viewed and responded to the changing market environment in which they were operating, with a particular focus on their attempts to self-regulate, lobby the political system and develop profitable business strategies. Understanding industry motivations and business strategies can help inform effective implementation and enforcement of new regulatory regimes.
Section snippets
Historical background: the evolution of LHI in New Zealand
In the early 2000s New Zealand experienced an emerging market for so called ‘party pills’ containing mixtures of benzylpiperazine (BZP) and trifluoromethylphenylpiperazine (TFMPP) (Wilkins & Sweetsur, 2010). Initially unregulated (i.e. with no legal limits on age of purchase, promotion or place of sale), BZP/TFMPP ‘party pills’ varied in strength and quality, and were sold from counter culture stores and increasingly from local convenience stores (Sheridan & Butler, 2007). By 2004,
Methods
A range of industry reports and documents were reviewed as formative work for the study, including industry association websites (www.legalhighs.co.nz, www.stargateinternational.org, www.thestartrust.org), public submissions to the PSA from the industry associations and LHI manufacturing and retail businesses (“Submissions to the Psychoactive Substances Bill 2013,” 2013), self-regulation resources (i.e. STANZ and PITA codes of conducts and manufacturing practice), an industry funded research
LHI motivations
LHI key informants emphasised drug law reform as a motivation for their involvement in the legal high market. A couple of participants stressed their “involvement in cannabis law reform” (KI-1) and that they personally aimed to achieve “some movement on the cannabis law” (KI-3). Some focused on health-centred aims, i.e. to provide users of recreational drugs, including alcohol, tobacco and illegal drugs, access to lower risk, safer alternatives. They commented that the LHI aimed to change
Discussion and conclusions
Interviews with LHI actors highlighted tensions between the idealistic health promotion motivations as espoused by pioneering operators and the commercial demands of the regulated market, and this tension increased as the market became more competitive. It is by no means clear that the LHI industry was achieving its goal of providing “safer drug alternatives”. A number of New Zealand studies identified serious health problems and issues of dependency related to the use of approved synthetic
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank all the legal high industry key informants who agreed to be interviewed for this study.
Conflict of interest
No funding has been accepted for this research from the legal high, alcohol, tobacco, or pharmaceutical industries.
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2018, International Journal of Drug PolicyCitation Excerpt :The advertising regulations for the cannabis market in Colorado have been modelled on the voluntary code of conduct developed by the alcohol industry, and the Colorado cannabis industry has attempted to weaken pesticide regulations for cannabis cultivation (Lenton, 2014; Subritzky, et al., 2016a). Similarly, in New Zealand, the “legal high” industry formed the Social Tonics Association of New Zealand (STANZ) to promote their interests in the media and among the public, and mounted judicial challenges against decisions to withdraw products with adverse effects, and against attempts by local councils to restrict the location of retail outlets (Rychert & Wilkins, 2016, 2017; Wilkins et al., 2013; Wilkins, 2014). For their part, drug policy researchers have pointed out that there are actually many more regulatory options for legal cannabis markets than alcohol style regulation, including “social clubs”, “grow-your-own”, “not-for-profit” and government monopoly (Caulkins & Kilmer, 2016; Caulkins et al., 2015; Decorte et al., 2017; Decorte, 2015; Kilmer, 2014; Room, 2014; Room, Fischer, Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010).
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