Research paper
Non-violent threats and promises among closed-market drug dealers

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.12.005Get rights and content

Abstract

Background

An unintended consequence of drug prohibitions is that they often fail to absolutely deter potential drug dealers and users and instead restrictively deter them. One way in which dealers sometimes alter their behaviour in response to these prohibitions is by using violent forms of social control to prevent their customers from committing careless behaviour or from becoming police informants. Many dealers, however, are reluctant to use violent forms of social control for various reasons. Little research has explored how these dealers use nonviolent threats and promises to prevent these behaviours among their customers and how these forms of social control then influence their perceptions of the risk of formal punishment.

Methods

To perform this examination, this paper employs information gathered through semi-structured interviews with 33 unincarcerated illicit drug sellers operating in and around St. Louis, Missouri.

Results

This group of drug dealers relied on threats of nonviolent outcomes to prevent their customers from behaving carelessly before, during, and after drug transactions and used implicit promises of continued rewards to dissuade customers from providing information to the police. They presumed that these measures reduced the likelihood of their customers committing these actions. This then decreased their perceptions of the risks of selling illicit drugs.

Conclusion

The present findings suggest that an unintended impact of drug prohibitions is that they sometimes restrictively deter drug dealers instead of preventing them from selling illicit drugs. They also suggest that restrictive deterrence among drug dealers can take the shape of social control. The findings also indicate that friendship norms can serve to inoculate dealers against the threat of formal punishment. Finally, the study suggests that levels of drug market violence may be related more to the nature of the relationships between drug market participants and their cultures.

Section snippets

Background

Many nations throughout the world have drug control policies prohibiting citizens from selling and possessing illicit drugs (Knutsson, 2000, MacCoun and Reuter, 2001, United Nations, 2015, Willis, 2008). The penalties for violating these prohibitions are, in part, intended to prevent citizens from using and/or selling these drugs (Corman and Mocan, 2000, Knutsson, 2000, MacCoun, 1993, Spencer, 1995). The assumption that individuals may avoid selling and/or possessing illicit drugs out of fear

Methods

The present study is based on data collected through semi-structured interviews with 33 individuals engaged in the sale of illicit drugs in and around St. Louis, Missouri. These individuals were located and recruited from school and employment-based social networks from January, 2012 to July, 2012 using purposive and snowball sampling strategies (see Wright, Decker, Redfern, & Smith, 1992). To be included in the study, the informants had to either be currently selling illegal drugs at the time

Bad etiquette

According to the dealers, worry about being arrested by police, “crosses your mind everyday” (Burt, cocaine, ketamine, LSD, MDMA supplier) when regularly selling illicit drugs. They reported that a key source of this worry was uncircumspect behaviour among their customers, or in their words, having “bad etiquette” (Gus, cannabis supplier/seller), when arranging, conducting, and exiting drug deals. They defined bad etiquette as an assortment of behaviours thought likely to increase police

Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to explore how a group of active drug dealers respond to illicit drug prohibitions by using non-violent forms of social control to influence the behaviour of their customers. The findings demonstrate that this group of dealers threaten to avoid customers, or cease selling them illicit drugs, when customers commit actions thought likely to direct police attention toward dealers or to provide them with incriminating evidence of the dealers’ drug-related crimes. The

Conflict of interest statement

None declared.

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