Research paperNon-violent threats and promises among closed-market drug dealers
Section snippets
Background
Many nations throughout the world have drug control policies prohibiting citizens from selling and possessing illicit drugs (Knutsson, 2000, MacCoun and Reuter, 2001, United Nations, 2015, Willis, 2008). The penalties for violating these prohibitions are, in part, intended to prevent citizens from using and/or selling these drugs (Corman and Mocan, 2000, Knutsson, 2000, MacCoun, 1993, Spencer, 1995). The assumption that individuals may avoid selling and/or possessing illicit drugs out of fear
Methods
The present study is based on data collected through semi-structured interviews with 33 individuals engaged in the sale of illicit drugs in and around St. Louis, Missouri. These individuals were located and recruited from school and employment-based social networks from January, 2012 to July, 2012 using purposive and snowball sampling strategies (see Wright, Decker, Redfern, & Smith, 1992). To be included in the study, the informants had to either be currently selling illegal drugs at the time
Bad etiquette
According to the dealers, worry about being arrested by police, “crosses your mind everyday” (Burt, cocaine, ketamine, LSD, MDMA supplier) when regularly selling illicit drugs. They reported that a key source of this worry was uncircumspect behaviour among their customers, or in their words, having “bad etiquette” (Gus, cannabis supplier/seller), when arranging, conducting, and exiting drug deals. They defined bad etiquette as an assortment of behaviours thought likely to increase police
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore how a group of active drug dealers respond to illicit drug prohibitions by using non-violent forms of social control to influence the behaviour of their customers. The findings demonstrate that this group of dealers threaten to avoid customers, or cease selling them illicit drugs, when customers commit actions thought likely to direct police attention toward dealers or to provide them with incriminating evidence of the dealers’ drug-related crimes. The
Conflict of interest statement
None declared.
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